The following article is from our March 2009 issue.

The Agent of Change At age 60, NATO plays an ever more important role internationally - By Michael Rühle

Founded in 1949 to keep "the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down," NATO today is busier than ever before - globally. Its future success will rest as much on political and economic development as on military prowess.

It all started with a short piece of paper. On April 4, 1949, the foreign ministers of ten Western European countries and their U.S. and Canadian counterparts met in Washington to sign a mutual defense pact. The Washington Treaty marked a break with the habits of American isolationism and the fear of "entangling alliances." The United States, which had fought two world wars to prevent Europe from being dominated by a single power, would from now on remain engaged there.

This change in American foreign policy was far from wholehearted, however. The treaty's duration was initially set at 20 years, reflecting the transitory nature of the project. The Washington Post quipped that the signing ceremony might well have been "more spectacular than the act itself."

Even after the early 1950s, when the Washington Treaty had turned into an actual institution called NATO, doubts persisted about the Alliance's life expectancy. Throughout the Cold War, NATO appeared to struggle with the paradoxes of different nations trying to act in common. As a result, the Atlantic Alliance appeared to be in a permanent state of crisis.

Only in retrospect does it become clear how well NATO actually worked. Its consultation process was cumbersome, yet introduced a sense of predictability and a pre-disposition among members - big and small - to seek common solutions. The consensus rule made for decision-making that was often slow and tedious but it also assured that, once a decision was taken, the allies would carry it through.

On the surface, NATO's military strategy was an uneasy compromise between conflicting interests and limited military means. Yet looking back, the Alliance managed to do what mattered most: to convey the message that Western Europe and North America considered themselves one single security space. This message not only provided deterrence, it also denied the Soviet Union the political use of its military power.

Europeans, in turn, often accused the United States of trying to dominate NATO and only paying lip service to European defense integration. So deep were the frictions that France left NATO's military structure in 1966, forcing the Alliance to move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels.

Yet, on balance, the transatlantic relationship worked. Over several decades, a close community emerged, based on both common values and a shrewd calculation of interests: for North America as well as for Europe, it paid off to stay together.

Their mutual interest in the transatlantic bargain also explains why all the predictions of NATO's demise after the end of the Cold War turned out to be wrong. Not only did NATO provide the congenial security framework for German reunification, it also took on a major role in helping to transform Europe from a divided continent into an undivided security space.

To act as an agent of change, NATO created an elaborate set of policies. It developed political and military partnerships with countries all over central and Eastern Europe and into Central Asia. It established bilateral relationships with Russia and Ukraine to reflect the particular weight and geopolitical importance of these countries. And by offering the prospect of membership, NATO was able to encourage a great number of interested countries to get their house in order.

The 1990s also saw NATO's first military operations. As Yugoslavia descended into violent conflict, NATO, after a long and painful debate, finally took on a new role as a peacekeeper. At times, notably during the controversial Kosovo air campaign in the spring of 1999, it appeared as if the Balkans challenge might overtax the Alliance. In the end, however, NATO was a key factor in helping to bring that wayward region back into the European mainstream.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 marked a new chapter in NATO's evolution. They made clear that the major threats to NATO allies no longer originated in Europe but in regions well away from the "old continent." In the face of international terrorism, failing states and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, NATO's traditional self-image as a purely "Eurocentric" alliance quickly became obsolete, and the Alliance had to be prepared to tackle problems at their source.

The allies must now cope with an ever-broader spectrum of missions. Today, NATO is engaged in combat in Afghanistan; keeping the peace in Kosovo; assisting defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; patrolling the Mediterranean Sea in a naval anti-terrorist mission; training Afghan and Iraqi security forces and providing logistical support for the African Union. At the same time, alliance members must also prepare for emerging challenges and consider NATO's role in energy security, defending against cyber attacks and addressing the security implications of climate change.

Sustaining this broad agenda poses significant challenges. Not only are most of NATO's new missions long-term in nature, their ultimate success also depends on political and economic development rather than military preponderance. As a result, NATO must calibrate its military contribution with civilian actors more than ever before. Moreover, its members now face the prospect of suffering casualties in missions very far away from home - a challenge not least in terms of managing public opinion.

Finally, it is worth remembering that NATO's "traditional" mission of consolidating Europe is far from accomplished, as shown by the delicate balancing act between continuing the enlargement process and maintaining a viable relationship with Russia.

So at age 60, NATO is busier than ever before and increasingly acting in concert with the wider international community. Although the security environment in which the Alliance originated has changed beyond recognition, the logic of transatlantic security cooperation remains as powerful today as it was in 1949.

- Michael Rühle is deputy head of the Policy Planning Section, Private Office of the Secretary General, NATO, Brussels.


Picture above: At the White House, April 4, 1949: U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson signing the North Atlantic Alliance Treaty. Next to him: Vice President Alben Barkley (left) and President Harry Truman (center).