The following article is from our March 2007 issue.

No Digs at Moscow The West has to stick to its promises - By Ulrich Weisser

The president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, used his invitation to the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy to draw attention to three strategic problems that have raised concern in Moscow.

First, he faulted the West for still not ratifying the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that was agreed upon in 1999. Russia, by contrast, which accommodated itself to the new geopolitical situation, had long since fulfilled the conditions set by the West and had ratified the treaty.

Second, he expressed his concern that though the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had, as part of the "zero-zero solution" reached during the 1980s, agreed to renounce short- and medium-range nuclear missiles, the two Koreas, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel had or were working on just these kinds of weapons and were planning to incorporate them into their arsenals. Despite this growing strategic challenge, Russia had to watch this development proceed while remaining practically defenseless.

Third, he made clear he was particularly concerned about the American project to build a defense system against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

In this, Russia sees a development capable of destabilizing the strategic balance between the U.S. and Russia that had been equalized through bilateral agreements. From the Russian point of view, a defensive system set up unilaterally to protect against ballistic missiles would protect the U.S. but simultaneously give it the one-sided opportunity to use its strategic potential in an offensive manner. This development takes on an additional dynamic, as viewed from Moscow, inasmuch as Washington has yet to ratify the most recent agreement on nuclear arms control.

Particularly irritating to Russia is the American intention to not limit their anti-ballistic missile defense system to their own territory but to place them in central and Eastern Europe. Ten anti-missile defense system installations are likely to be placed in Poland, their associated long-range radar stations to be stationed on Czech soil.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained in Munich that these facilities were directed against possible developments "in Iran and elsewhere," and not against Russia, but this statement is not necessarily conclusive.

If the U.S. actually fears Europe could, in the foreseeable future, be threatened by Iranian missiles carrying nuclear warheads, then this should be discussed in NATO. The alliance can decide as a whole whether they agree this is a genuine threat, and also about what should be done about it. Additionally, this potential threat would also likely be directed against Russia, so that these same questions ought to be raised and answered in the NATO-Russia Council, in order to decide upon a common strategy. The strategic partnership between NATO and Russia has been guided by the thought of seeking security with Russia - and not seeking security from Russia.

In practice, this means that NATO and Russia must decide together how much of a danger both sides regard the fact that Iran had already successfully completed flight tests of its new medium-range SAHAB 3 missiles on July 7, 2003. This missile, with its 1,300-km range, is ready to be deployed; its successor SAHAB 4 missile is to have an even longer range of 2,000 km. The developments are ongoing. However, it does not make much military sense to place conventional warheads on such missiles; the expense and effort do not stand in any reasonable relation to the projected effects. In that sense, much speaks for the fact that at some point, Iran intends to arm these missiles with nuclear warheads.

Speaking against this, however, is that it is not entirely clear whether Iran has actually embarked on a nuclear program that can be converted for militarily use, or whether the "Iranian nuclear dossier" couldn't instead be addressed successfully through diplomacy. Even if this were not the case, it would take at least five years until Iran can successfully complete its nuclear development program, and more years still until weaponization becomes feasible.

At the same time, Iran would have to develop missiles with a range capable of reaching central Europe. A missile defense system would then first need to protect Europe's Mediterranean countries and not primarily protect Poland. It also remains unclear how dangerous the fragments of a fired-off rocket carrying nuclear warheads might be, or where such fragments would land.

The missile defense system the U.S. wants to station in Poland may therefore in truth and in fact more likely be directed against Russia. A further irritation in this context is that statements coming from Polish government circles quite bluntly draw attention to the new Russian TOPOL-M missiles, not to a potential threat coming from the south.

In fact, Russia regards the modernization of its strategic capacities as necessary in light of the emerging and basic shift of the strategic balance in favor of the U.S. This has been expressed in the development of the new Russian intercontinental TOPOL-M missile, said to have a range of about 10,000 to 12,000 kilometers. It could only with great difficulty be intercepted by an anti-missile defense system.

The U.S. has yet to consult either with its other individual allies, NATO or Russia, with regard to its intentions for an anti-ballistic missile defense system. It is a bilaterally agreed-upon project, the strategic arguments for which have been explained with various rationales, leaving matters wide open for speculation.

Quite apart from U.S. and Polish actions, or Western behavior with respect to the arms control agreements that cover conventional and nuclear weapons, Moscow's annoyance has been building with respect to what they perceive as unfair treatment by the West over questions of security policy.

At the Munich meeting, Putin most certainly had in mind the assurances given to the Soviet Union before the first round of NATO's eastward expansion. In that context, he quoted directly from a speech by NATO's former General Secretary Manfred Wörner, given in Brussels on May 17, 1990: "The very fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee." "Where are these guarantees now," the Russian president asked.

Prior to admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO had indeed stated to Russia that there was no need, no plan, and no intention to undertake such stationing. The alliance has not held his promise. On the contrary, the U.S. has even secured rights in Romania to establish forward bases for its air force.

Moscow also feels provoked by the behavior of a number of newer NATO member states in central and Eastern Europe. Poland and the Baltic states use every opportunity to make provocative digs at Russia; they feel themselves protected by NATO and backed by the U.S. It is against this backdrop that one can understand the blunt tenor of the Russian president's words in Munich; he was articulating Russian interests and concerns. Press reports about how this augurs a reopening of Cold War completely miss the point and are more than misleading.

- Retired Vice Admiral Ulrich Weisser was head of the policy and planning staff in the German Ministry of Defense from 1992 to 1998. He now works as a strategic advisor to governments and industry.